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Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climatic Change, [UNFCCC, 1998] , proposes to limit future aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent greenhouse gas emissions (Article 3.1). The Kyoto Protocol also establishes the concept of credits for carbon sinks. These credits can be used to meet a country's emission limitation and reduction commitment. Currently, carbon sinks are limited to recent efforts in afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation and do not include agricultural soils (Article 3.3). However, Article 3.4 leaves the future inclusion of agricultural soils a distinct possibility by stating "…Parties to this Protocol shall…decide upon modalities, rules, and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land use change and forestry categories shall be added to or subtracted from the assigned amounts…" Tillage practices are important human-induced activities that deal with carbon sequestration and greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural soils [Lal et al, 1998 ].
Conservation tillage reduces soil and water erosion when compared to conventional plow-based tillage systems. Conservation tillage uses crop residue to serve as mulch to protect and increase the soil organic carbon (SOC) levels. Conventional tillage systems disturb the soil and leave it unprotected from wind and rainfall, resulting in a decrease in SOC levels. Increasing the adoption of conservation tillage practices will increase carbon sequestration rates in agricultural soils and decrease the greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector. 2 The purpose of this research is to discuss the relative efficiency of various government-based and market-based instruments available to policymakers that reduce the amount of carbon emissions from agricultural soils through the increased adoption of conservation tillage. First, various government-based subsidy schemes that encourage the adoption of conservation tillage are examined. Next, various market-based policy instruments of granting producers a carbon credit [Sandor and Skees, 1999] are examined. The total expected cost of reducing agricultural carbon emissions to a certain level is estimated for both the government-based and market-based policies. The relative efficiency of different programs is then determined.
Modeling the Supply of Environmental Goods
Estimating the likely changes in environmental quality from policies that affect agricultural decisions involves modeling farmer responses to the adopted policy and the subsequent change in environmental quality. The mapping of policy changes to changes in environmental quality is clearly an ex ante exercise. Policy makers do not know with certainty how farmers will react to the policy nor do they know precisely how environmental quality will change. The approach taken here recognizes the ex ante nature of this mapping and estimates the expected supply of environmental quality given a policy induced price change.
Environmental quality supply depends on the farmer's choice of production practice and the environmental impact of that practice. Expected supply is then the weighted average of the environmental quality supply from each practice, where the weights are the probability of adopting the associated production practices. Hence, the expected change in environmental quality from a newly instituted policy is dependent 3 upon the increased probability that the more environmental-friendly practice is adopted and the expected change in environmental quality given that the more environmentalfriendly practice is adopted. Since both adoption probabilities and the change in environmental quality vary across farmers and production sites, the site-specific expected change in environmental quality must be aggregated across all sites to obtain the aggregate change in expected supply.
Farmers Adoption Decisions
Producers will adopt either a conventional or conservation tillage system when growing their crops. Let cv Eπ and cs Eπ denote the expected returns from conventional and conservation tillage practices. Producers are assumed to be risk neutral and adopt the tillage system that maximizes expected returns. A conservation tillage system is adopted when the expected returns from conservation tillage exceed the expected returns from conventional tillage, i.e., cv cs
. The expected returns from conventional and conservation tillage, however, are not observable. The choice between conventional and conservation tillage is observable as well as production and geographical characteristics such as soil, weather, land, and cropping patterns.
The expected returns from each tillage system is assumed to be linearly related to the vector of observable production and geographical characteristics (x), 
Environmental Supply Curves
The choice of a tillage system affects the environment in many different ways, such as the degree of soil erosion, the amount of soil carbon released into the atmosphere, and the runoff and leaching of pesticides as well as fertilizer nutrients. The magnitude of carbon emissions from different tillage practices depends upon various production and geographical characteristics such as soil, weather, land, and cropping history. Suppose there are I different production sites indexed by the subscript i, i=1,…,I. Denote the carbon emissions from the i th production site when using conventional and conservation tillage as
Only carbon supply curves will be derived, but other environmental supply curves can be developed in a similar fashion. The expected amount of carbon emitted into the 5 atmosphere at the i th production site is equal to the amount of carbon released into the atmosphere when using conservation tillage multiplied by the probability of using conservation tillage plus the amount of carbon released into the atmosphere when using conventional tillage multiplied by the probability of using conventional tillage. With green payments, the expected amount of carbon emitted into the atmosphere on a per acre basis at the i th production site is denoted as,
The total expected amount of carbon sequestered from the i th production site,
( )
i i x k Q | , is defined as the difference between the amount of carbon released into the atmosphere if conventional tillage is used with certainty minus the expected amount of carbon emitted into the atmosphere under the green payment,
The intercept of the expected carbon supply curve is the level of carbon sequestered without any green payment, while the slope is the expected increase in sequestered carbon (or reduction in carbon emissions) as a result of increasing the green payment.
Policy Analysis
Various government-based subsidy programs that encourage the adoption of Market-based solutions are also investigated in the form of a carbon credit program. In a carbon credit program, producers receive a carbon credit from the government that is redeemable in an organized carbon market outside of the agricultural sector. Given the market price of carbon, producers can either sell their carbon credit and use conservation tillage practices or keep their carbon credit and use conventional tillage practices. Carbon credit programs are differentiated by the amount of carbon credit given to each producer. It will be shown that by varying the distribution of carbon credits given to producers, a market-based carbon credit program can be equivalent to any type of government-based EQIP subsidy program.
EQIP Subsidy Programs
An EQIP subsidy program is a collection of subsidies, denoted by
where imn k is the per acre subsidy offered to the producer at the i th site of the m th state 7 growing the n th crop. The expected number of acres using conservation tillage practices under an EQIP subsidy program k is denoted as
and equal to,
where; 
where;
imn Q = expected supply of the j th enviromental measure from the i th site in the m th state growing the n th crop.
The total expected cost of an EQIP subsidy program,
Many different EQIP subsidy schemes will produce the same expected overall level of carbon sequestration but at different expected costs. The subsidy scheme that minimizes the total expected cost of acquiring a given level of expected carbon, Q , is found by,
The first order condition states that at the minimum, the expected marginal cost of acquiring carbon is equal across all producers,
represents the optimal expected marginal cost of acquiring carbon, imn TC is the total expected cost of acquiring carbon from the i th site in the m th state growing the crop, and * imn k represents its optimal subsidy. If the expected marginal cost of acquiring carbon from a source exceeds the expected marginal cost from another source, then total expected cost of carbon sequestration can be lowered by altering the subsidy scheme. Decreasing the subsidy of the more expensive provider and increasing the subsidy of the less expensive provider, such that the total level of carbon sequestration is unchanged, will lower the total expected cost of carbon sequestration.
Total expected costs are lowered until the marginal cost of acquiring expected carbon are equalized across all sources.
The first order condition is re-written as follows,
elasticity of adoption.
The optimal subsidy offered to producers is dependent upon their willingness to adopt conservation tillage practices and their ability to sequester carbon through conservation tillage practices. The elasticity of adoption ( ) imn ω represents a producer's willingness to adopt conservation practices. The greater the elasticity of adoption, the greater the increase in the probability of adopting conservation tillage for a marginal increase in the subsidy. Per acre difference in the amount of carbon emissions between conventional and conservation tillage
− represents the producer's ability to sequester carbon. Under the cost minimizing EQIP subsidy program, producers with a greater willingness to adopt conservation tillage and ability to sequester carbon will receive the greater per acre subsidies.
The second order condition for a minimum is not met globally, since the adoption function may be either concave or convex. A grid search was conducted to find the * λ that minimized the total expected costs of sequestering an expected level of carbon.
Offering a different subsidy to each producer, will, however, create very high administrative costs and may also be politically infeasible. To avoid potential these barriers, suppose the EQIP subsidy program encouraging the adoption of conservation tillage consists of only a single per acre subsidy offered to all producers, so that
. Such a program is more politically feasible and has lower administrative costs, but the overall expected transfers to producers would be higher for a given expected level of carbon sequestration. Figure 1 presents the relative inefficiency of the single EQIP subsidy program when compared to the minimum cost EQIP subsidy program for the two-producer case.
The iso-carbon curves, Q 0 and Q 1 , represent the combination of subsidies offered to producers ( ) 2 1 , k k that leave the overall expected level of carbon sequestration unchanged. The iso-cost curves, TC, represent the combination of subsidies offered to producers that leave the overall expected cost of carbon sequestration unchanged. The slopes of the iso-carbon and iso-cost curves are shown to be convex and concave, respectively, but this may not necessarily be the case. As stated previously, the adoption function may either be concave or convex.
The 45 o ray S r represents the solution set for the single EQIP subsidy program 2 1 k k = . At point B, the single EQIP subsidy program is expected to sequester Q 0 amount of carbon at an expected cost of TC 1 . At this point, the iso-cost curve is steeper than the iso-carbon curve. This implies that for a marginal decrease in the subsidy to producer 2, the increase in the subsidy to producer 1 needed to keep the expected level of carbon sequestration unchanged is smaller than the increase needed to keep expected costs unchanged. Hence, expected costs can be lowered without changing the expected level of carbon sequestration. Expected costs are decreased until the slope of the iso-cost curve equals the slope of the iso-carbon curve, so that the marginal cost of acquiring carbon is equal across producers.
Points A and C represent the minimum cost EQIP subsidy schemes that are expected to sequester Q 0 and Q 1 amounts of carbon, respectively. The relative inefficiency of the single EQIP subsidy scheme can be expressed as the increase in total expected costs, TC 1 -TC 0 , for the given level of carbon sequestration Q 0 as well as in terms of the decreased level of carbon sequestration Q 1 -Q 0 for a given level of expected cost TC 1 . is the carbon credit given to all producers.
Carbon Credit Program
Empirical Analysis
The study region consists of the Lake States of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Given the crop choices and crop rotations predicted by ARMS, the next steps are to estimate the probability of adopting conservation tillage practices at each of the NRI points in the study area and to estimate the difference in carbons emissions from conventional and conservation tillage. Conventional tillage is defined as a tillage system that maintains less than 30% residue cover. While, conservation tillage is assumed to be no-till and is defined as a tillage system that maintains at least 70% residue cover [CTIC, 1993] . The remainder of this section will present the empirical conservation tillage adoption model and the estimated relationship between tillage practices and carbon emissions from agricultural soils. 13 Table 1 presents the variables used to estimate the probability that conservation tillage is practiced at each of the NRI points in the study area. All data were for the 1992-growing season. Tables 2-4 present for the Corn Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains, the estimated influence of each of these variables on the probability of adopting conservation tillage as well as the standard error and associated t-statistic. The overall fit of the predicted logit model to conservation tillage adoption is very strong in the Lake States and Northern Plains States and is satisfactory in the Corn Belt region. The percentage of correct predictions by the logit model is 86.4% for the Lake States, 84.7% for the Northern Plains States, and 71.5% for the Corn Belt States. 
Conservation Tillage Adoption Model
Calibration Factor
Identifying Restriction
In the estimation of the conservation tillage adoption model, the error term is assumed to be logistically distributed with a fixed variance of 3 / 2 π . This variance determines how much of a payment is needed to increase the probability of adoption to a certain level. In 1997, 39.8% of the total study area acreage was in conservation tillage.
This implies an "overall study area average" x β value of −0 4138 . , so that the overall adoption rate is ( ) 
. This payment is the same whether the choice is between tillage systems, investment choices, or business decisions.
For the logit model to be meaningful in each separate application, an additional "identifying" restriction is needed to reflect the resistance of adopting conservation tillage. The payments necessary to entice 95% of current non-adopters of environmentally beneficial management practices such as integrated pest management, legume crediting, manure testing, and soil moisture testing have been estimated in the range of $65 to $75 per acre [Cooper and Keim, 1996] . The current adoption rates for these practices are, however, much lower than for conservation tillage. Hence, it is assumed that a smaller payment is needed to reach a 95% adoption rate of conservation tillage.
In the analysis, it is assumed that a 95% adoption rate occurs with a $20 per acre subsidy. The subsidies offered to producers that increase the likelihood of conservation tillage adoption are then multiplied by 5.96. This factor is found by dividing the assumed $20 payment by the payment found with the unidentified logit model ($3.36). 15 
Tillage Practices and Carbon Emissions
The Site-Specific Pollution Production (SIPP) modeling system [Mitchell et al, 1997 ] uses information from the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator version 5300 [Sharpley and Williams, 1988] , the Pesticide Root Zone Model 2.0 [Mullins et al, 1993] , and both the NASS and NRI databases [USDA/SCS, 1994] . SIPP estimates the changes in several environmental measures due to different management practices. These environmental measures are changes in SOC levels, water erosion, wind erosion, nitrogen runoff, nitrogen leaching, atrazine runoff, atrazine leaching, and atrazine volatilization.
A more detailed discussion of the process used to estimate the influence of crop choice, crop rotation, tillage practice, and geographic information on carbon emissions and carbon sequestration is presented in Mitchell et al. (1997) . 
Results
Estimated Carbon Supply Curve
Figure 2 presents the carbon supply curve for the single EQIP subsidy program.
The carbon supply curve rises gradually and becomes nearly vertical as the maximum level of carbon sequestration is approached. An incentive payment of $8.40 per acre will sequester 18.44 mmt of carbon, while a payment of $20.50 per acre will sequester 23.90 mmt of carbon. The carbon supply prices depend greatly on the overall resistance to conservation tillage adoption as reflected in the identifying restriction. For example, the carbon supply curve will rotate up from C S 0 to C S 1 , if the identifying restriction were increased, so that 95% conservation tillage adoption throughout the study area is assumed to occur with a $30 rather $20 per acre subsidy.
The carbon supply curve relates carbon sequestered to the single per acre EQIP subsidy. To compare the efficiency of the single EQIP subsidy program and discuss its second-best nature, the total expected cost of acquiring sequestered carbon is examined and compared with the minimum cost EQIP subsidy program. The purpose of this research was to examine various policy instruments that promote carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions through increased adoption of conservation tillage. It was shown that that by varying the distribution of carbon credits given to producers, a market-based carbon credit program can become equivalent to any type of government-based EQIP subsidy program. Hence, the payments needed to increase the agricultural sector's adoption of conservation tillage can be switched from the public sector to the private sector.
Cost of Acquiring Sequestered Carbon
The expected cost of carbon sequestration was estimated for the single subsidy and minimum cost EQIP programs. The same expected costs of carbon sequestration would occur under a carbon credit program as under the EQIP subsidy program given the appropriate distribution of carbon credits. A different subsidy or size of carbon credit for each producer, however, may be prohibitively costly due to high administrative and 19 political costs. A single subsidy or size of carbon credit program will lower these costs, but will have higher operating costs. The relative inefficiency of the single subsidy EQIP program was measured in terms of the increase in expected costs when sequestering an expected level of carbon. The inefficiency of the single subsidy or carbon credit program relative to the minimum cost program is $119 million when sequestering 13.18 mmt of expected carbon and $800 million when sequestering 23.90 mmt of expected carbon. If the political and administrative costs are higher than these levels, then a single subsidy or carbon credit is more economically feasible.
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